Showing posts with label Gaudium et Spes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gaudium et Spes. Show all posts

Thursday, June 18, 2026

Conscience at the Crossroads: From Nakusha to Priya — A Story of Reversal and Reclaiming the human dignity

 


Savio Saldanha

DOI : 10.5281/zenodo.20749131

Date: 18-06-2026

            A few years ago, I was a Jesuit novice teaching catechism in a small parish near Belgaum. It was the kind of class where you learn far more than you teach. One afternoon I was going around the room asking each child to tell me the meaning of her own name, expecting the usual answers — gift of God, light, little flower. One girl was very quiet. When I gently pressed, she said, almost as a fact of life and not a wound, “Nakusha.” We both knew it meant unwanted in Marathi.

            I did not know what to do with that silence. I had walked in to teach them that God loves them without condition, that they are precious in his eyes. But before I could say a word, her own name had already said something else. The Gospel I wanted to proclaim arrived a few seconds too late. Nakusha had already been spoken. That moment has stayed with me through my formation, and it has become the heart of my Jesuit vocation. I want to share it here, not as an academic exercise, nor for any credit, but as the question it actually is: what does the Church say to a child whose own name calls her unwanted?

A Campaign That Tried to Undo a Name

            Nakusha is a real name, given mostly in rural Maharashtra — my home state — to girls born when the family wanted a son. In October 2011, the district administration of Satara, working with local health officials and a girl-child welfare project, found close to 280 girls registered under this name or its variants (Dagadi, Dhondi — both meaning “stone”). They organised a public ceremony where the girls themselves, some as young as toddlers and some in their late teens, were invited to choose new names. Many chose names that meant the opposite of what they had been called: beloved, powerful, true. It was, by every account, a moving day, and it is still cited as a small but real victory for the dignity of the girl child in India.

            But a renaming ceremony, however beautiful, does not change the conditions that produced the first name. India’s sex ratio at birth has improved over the last decade through sustained public effort, yet it remains skewed below the natural ratio, and in Haryana — one of the states that had made the most visible progress — it actually slipped backward again in 2024. The economists Ashwini Deshpande and Apoorva Gupta published a 2020 study that still uses the word “Nakusha” as a working term, not a historical curiosity, to describe how son preference shapes which children get fed, schooled, and invested in. The name may now be rarer in official records. The reality it named has not gone away. This is why the question is not history for me. It is still happening.

            That is the question this reflection tries to answer, and it unfolds in five simple moves. First, Amoris Laetitia teaches that every child is loved without condition and that women and men share equal dignity as the image of God. Second, naming a girl “unwanted” inscribes rejection into her very identity — this is the wound. Third, the Bible already knows this pattern: in the Book of Hosea, God commands names of rejection upon Israel’s children, and then reverses them. Fourth, if God does this for an unfaithful people, the same logic applies with even greater force to an innocent child. Fifth, the Church’s response cannot stop at theology — it has to become a pastoral practice: naming, accompanying, and changing the conditions that produce the wound in the first place.

Amoris Laetitia

            Pope Francis’s 2016 exhortation on the family gives us three texts that matter here. In paragraphs 54–55, he insists that women possess full and equal dignity with men as bearers of God’s image, and he names outright the many forms of discrimination still directed at women and girls. In paragraph 166, he writes that children are loved by their parents even before they arrive — love that asks nothing in return, that is not conditioned on what the child can offer. And in paragraph 170, he says that every child has a place in God’s heart from eternity, quoting the prophet Jeremiah: before I formed you in the womb I knew you (Jer 1:5).

            None of this is new to Francis. It stands on ground the Church has held since the Second Vatican Council, which in Gaudium et Spes (no. 29) declared that any discrimination based on sex is contrary to God’s design, and on John Paul II’s 1988 letter Mulieris Dignitatem, which grounded women’s dignity explicitly in the creation account. What Amoris Laetitia adds is not a new doctrine but a pastoral instinct: it does not only proclaim that dignity, it asks how the Church walks with families where that dignity has been wounded. That, exactly, is what I am trying to do with the Nakusha question — and to see why, it helps to look honestly at what a name like this actually does to a child.

The Wound Goes Deep

            A name like Nakusha does not hurt only the feelings. It works at three levels. It wounds identity itself: the girl is not told she did something unwanted, she is told she is unwanted, from her very first day, the one word everyone will call her for the rest of her life. It wounds the capacity to receive love: if your first experience of family is conditional — I would have loved you if you had been a boy — it becomes harder, later, to believe in a love that asks nothing of you. And it wounds faith before faith can even begin: how do you tell a child that God loves her without condition, when her own parents — the first face of love she ever knew — named her by her unworthiness? The name gets there before the Gospel does. That was exactly what I watched happen in that catechism class.

            Scripture, it turns out, has met this exact wound before — not in Belgaum, but some twenty-eight centuries earlier, in the household of a prophet named Hosea.

Hosea: A Name Reversed

            The Old Testament prophet Hosea is asked by God to give his own children prophetic names: Jezreel, Lo-Ruhamah (“not pitied”), Lo-Ammi (“not my people”). These names are a sign of Israel’s broken covenant — judgment spoken over an unfaithful nation. But the story does not end there. In chapter 2, God reverses the names: I will say to Not-My-People, You are my people (Hos 2:23). And in chapter 3, God commands Hosea to love his wife again, even after betrayal — a second act of love that refuses to let the first failure be final.

            I want to be precise about what this analogy is, and is not. It is structural, not moral. Israel deserved judgment for breaking the covenant; the Nakusha girl has done absolutely nothing wrong. I am not comparing her to an unfaithful nation, and I am not suggesting that God somehow permits or authors the wound of her naming so that a reversal can later happen. That would make God the author of cruelty, and nothing in the text says that. What the text does give us is a pattern: a name of rejection is spoken, and God refuses to let it be the last word. I want to be careful here, because reversal language can slide quietly into making the wound sound useful, as though the suffering was worth it for what came after. It was not, and it is not. The reversal does not give the wound a purpose; it simply refuses to let the wound have the final say over who this child is.

From the Lesser to the Greater

            This is where the logic, for me, becomes hard to escape. If God reverses the names of rejection spoken over a people who had genuinely broken faith with him, how much more readily — how much faster, how much more completely — will God restore the name and dignity of a child who is entirely innocent? Theologians call this reasoning a fortiori, “from the lesser to the greater”: what holds true in the harder case holds even more true in the easier one. Saint Paul uses exactly this logic in Romans: if we were reconciled to God while we were still his enemies, how much more, now that we are reconciled, will we be saved (Rom 5:10). The same logic applies here. If mercy reaches a faithless nation, it reaches an innocent child first, and more fully.

            This logic does not stop at birth. Amoris Laetitia 170, quoting Jeremiah, insists that God’s knowledge and love of a child precede even conception. So if God restores the name of a girl who was born and called unwanted, God certainly does not abandon the child who was never even allowed to be born because she was a girl. The same eternal love that the prophet describes — known before the womb — reaches her too.

Renaming, Accompaniment, and a Way Out

            None of this matters much if it stays on the page. So what would it actually look like, in an ordinary parish in Maharashtra, to put this logic into practice? A pastoral response has to begin where the wound is named, but it cannot stop at a beautiful ceremony. I propose a simple renaming rite — not a second baptism, but a blessing, in the spirit of the Church’s existing rituals of blessing a name. The community gathers, reads Hosea’s words of reversal, reads Jeremiah’s words about being known before birth, and says clearly to the child: we receive you, we name you Priya — beloved. I have suggested the name Priya deliberately. It is a word shared across Hindu, Christian, and Muslim communities in India, and it carries the same resonance as the Song of Songs, as Hosea’s restored mercy, as the voice at Jesus’ baptism: you are my beloved. The healing should come from the Holy Spirit working within the culture, in its own language, not as something imported from outside it.

            A ceremony like this can change what a community says over a child. It cannot, by itself, undo a habit built over years. In the actual 2011 campaign, one father was reported calling his newly renamed daughter by her old name a week later, simply out of habit, then catching himself with an awkward smile. That is not a failure of the rite. It is evidence that a name changes in a register long before it changes in the heart, and the second change takes much longer than an afternoon. The moral theologian Alain Thomasset, commenting on the same chapter of Amoris Laetitia that speaks of moral education, makes a point I find essential here: virtue is not learned by being told the rule once. It is learned the way you learn to play a sport well — not just knowing it is forbidden to foul, but acquiring, over time and within a community that practices it together, the taste and the habit of the good. Changing a culture of son preference will take the same patience: formation before marriage, accompaniment of mothers during pregnancy, and ongoing catechesis that keeps repeating, year after year, that a daughter is gift and not burden.

            I also want to be honest about what the parents in these situations are carrying — and that includes the mothers, who are very often under the same pressure their daughters will inherit. But it is worth saying clearly that women are not only the ones who carry this pressure; they are very often the ones who break it. The 2011 Satara campaign itself began at the suggestion of a local social activist, Sudha Kankaria, who pushed district officials to draw up the list of Nakusha girls in the first place. I do not think blame helps anyone here. Many of these families are not cruel; they are frightened. The fear of dowry, the shame a community attaches to “too many daughters,” the very real economic pressure of marrying off two or three girls — these are not invented anxieties. They are heavy and they are real. But naming that fear onto a newborn does not solve it; it only passes the weight from the parent’s shoulders onto the child’s identity, and the child carries it for life.

            The way out has to address both ends at once. On the spiritual side, this means the parish-level formation and renaming rite already described, accompaniment of both daughter and mother, and the conviction — taught patiently, not imposed in one sermon — that a girl’s worth has nothing to do with what she can be married off for. On the social and governmental side, this means real enforcement of laws already on the books: the Dowry Prohibition Act and the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, which forbids sex determination before birth; it means making use of, and pushing local administrations to properly fund, schemes like Beti Bachao Beti Padhao and conditional savings programmes for the girl child, so that a daughter becomes a visible economic asset to her family rather than only a looming cost. None of these instruments has worked as well as it should. Enforcement of the sex-determination ban has loosened in several states even as the technology to evade it has become easier to access, and an early government audit of Beti Bachao Beti Padhao found that more than half its budget had gone to advertising rather than direct support for girls. Naming a law is not the same as enforcing it, and any pastoral advocacy worth doing has to keep pressing on that gap rather than simply pointing to the law’s existence. It also means dioceses and Catholic social bodies working alongside these government efforts rather than separately from them, the way the Church already collaborates with girl-child organisations in several Indian states. James’s letter puts the choice bluntly: if you say “go in peace” to someone in need and do nothing for their actual situation, what good is that (Jas 2:16)? A purely spiritual solution, without addressing the dowry and the poverty behind the fear, would be exactly that — words without help.

God Already Knew Her Name

            Even with all of this in place — the rite, the formation, the advocacy — it helps to step back and remember that none of it is actually new. Scripture had already settled the deeper question long before any ceremony tried to catch up to it. When God first brings the animals to Adam in the garden, the man’s naming of them is an act of relationship and care, not domination (Gen 2:19–20) — which tells us that naming carries real moral weight; it is never a neutral act. To the prophet Isaiah, God says of Israel: I have called you by name, you are mine (Is 43:1) — the divine name arrives before, and outlasts, any name a human being gives. To Jeremiah, God says that he knew him before he was formed in the womb (Jer 1:5) — the very verse Amoris Laetitia 170 borrows. And in the Book of Revelation, God promises the faithful a new name, known only to the one who receives it, a name that no human rejection can ever touch or cancel (Rev 2:17).

            Put together, these four texts say something simple and very large: every girl ever called Nakusha was already named by God before her parents ever spoke a word over her, already known before she was formed, and is already promised a name that will outlast every name of rejection she has carried. The renaming ceremony the Church can offer is not an invention. It is simply the community catching up, out loud, to what God has already done in silence.

 A Word on Discernment

            Ignatian spirituality has one more thing to offer here, and it is not a technique but a habit of attention. Ignatius taught that God is found in the concrete and the particular — in this child, this family’s fear, this community’s silence — not in abstract talk about “the problem of patriarchy.” Discernment begins by noticing what a name, a fear, or a decision actually does to the heart: does it bring consolation, an opening toward life and trust, or does it bring desolation, a closing in on shame and despair? For the parent paralysed by the cost of a dowry, real accompaniment does not minimise the fear — it helps distinguish the fear, which is legitimate and deserves a real answer, from the despair that turns a daughter’s name into a verdict. And for anyone trying to respond pastorally to this wound, the same discernment applies inward: is my response coming from love for this particular child, or from an urge to fix things quickly and move on? Ignatius would ask us to sit with that question before we act.

 Conclusion

            I did not write this because I needed an academic exercise to finish in Paris. I wrote it because of the one girl in a Belgaum classroom who, years ago, told me without flinching that their own names meant unwanted — and because nothing I have studied since has answered that sentence more simply than Hosea already did, nearly three thousand years earlier: rejection does not get the last word, not for an unfaithful nation, and certainly not for a child who did nothing but be born a girl. The Church does not need to invent that mercy, though it has not always spoken it loudly enough, or to everyone who needed to hear it. What it needs to do, starting now is say it out loud, in time, before the wound speaks louder than the Gospel does.

            I do not know if either of those girls was ever told, the way Maharashtra tried to tell 280 others in 2011, that she could choose a different name for herself. I hope someone has, by now. But more than that, I hope for a day when no girl, in India or anywhere, needs to be renamed at all — because no one ever called her unwanted to begin with. Until that day comes, the least the Church can do is keep saying, clearly and often: you are Priya. You always were.

 

Bibliography

Scripture

Hosea 1–3; Isaiah 43:1; Jeremiah 1:5; Genesis 1:27; Genesis 2:19–20; Galatians 3:28; Romans 5:10; James 2:16; Revelation 2:17.

 

Magisterial and Church documents

Pope Francis, Amoris Laetitia (19 March 2016), §§54–55, 166, 170.

Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (1965), §29.

Pope John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem (1988).

Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§1272, 2156.

 

Theological and academic sources

Alain Thomasset, SJ, “L’éducation morale comme apprentissage des vertus,” Revue d’Éthique et de Théologie Morale, 2019/HS, pp. 129–146.

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (French ed., Après la vertu).

 

On the Nakusha naming practice and the 2011 Satara renaming campaign

“‘Nakusha’ campaign successful as 280 girls renamed in Maharashtra,” DNA India, October 2011.

“End ‘Nakusha’ campaign: Girls no more unwanted,” Zee News, 22 October 2011.

Freny Manecksha, “Renaming Nakusa,” India Together, 6 September 2011.

Ashwini Deshpande and Apoorva Gupta, “Nakusha? Son Preference, Resource Concentration and Gender Gaps in Education,” Working Paper, 2020, discussed in Ideas for India.

 

On sex ratio and government policy in India

Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India, Women and Men in India reports; National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), 2019–21; reporting on the Beti Bachao Beti Padhao scheme and the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (PCPNDT) Act, 1994; parliamentary and audit reporting on Beti Bachao Beti Padhao budget allocation; state-wise sex-ratio-at-birth data on the 2024 decline in Haryana.

 

Friday, January 9, 2026

At the crossroads of ancient Indian philosophy and how it has shaped India’s evolving social thought.


-          Savio Saldanha SJ

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18199195

Date: 09-01-2026

 

Ancient Indian Philosophy, Caste, and Conscience at the Crossroads

            As I reflect on my philosophical studies, I often find myself returning to the question of what it means to study Indian philosophy today—both as an academic pursuit and as a personal search within a society undergoing rapid change. Writing for my blog Conscience at Crossroads, I wanted to explore how these ancient schools of wisdom shape my own thinking and continue to influence India’s collective imagination. 

            Reflecting on the Indian philosophical schools and their influence on Indian culture and the collective memory of its people is a complex task. I am also interested to understand how the concept of casteism came into being through this culture and became what it is today. In this regards, I feel blessed to pursue my theological studies in France, as this distance has given me the chance to view these influences from the outside. Philosophically, there are two ways of looking at any system: from within, as one who belongs to it and therefore shares its limits and constraints; and from without, where a certain distance allows greater freedom, neutrality, and critical clarity, since one is not bound by the system’s internal pressures or expectations.

            As I was reflecting on the subject, one of my Jesuit friends, Seby Varghese sent me an article by Tony Joseph on a related topic. Tony Joseph’s article is empirically grounded history of how caste emerged and evolved; while I was reflecting about its normative-philosophical and theological discernment and how to engage that legacy today. This essay grows out of that struggle for clarity. The challenge, as I experience it, is discerning what in this heritage still carries life-giving insight, and what must be critically questioned or left behind. Some elements reveal their value or their harmfulness quite clearly; others are so deeply woven into our cultural habits and shared memory that distinguishing wisdom from distortion becomes far more difficult. The question for me is, ‘How to engage pro-actively with the Indian philosophical schools and the non-negotiable demands of social-justice today?’

 

Classical Indian philosophy and the formation of caste

            The classical darśanas—Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya–Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta—offered powerful visions of truth and liberation, and they continue to furnish key categories for public moral debate: dharma (interchanged between religion and duty), karma (the fruits of deeds- good or bad), saṃsāra (world), ahiṃsā (non-violence), and mokṣa (liberation). These concepts frame how many Indians still think about responsibility, suffering, and the good life. Yet the metaphysical reflections of classical texts were not socially innocent: Vedic and Dharmaśāstra traditions progressively translated them into a hierarchical order of varṇa and later jātis, sacralizing graded inequality.​

            Tony Joseph’s historical reconstruction clarifies how contingent and contested this development was. He shows that a fully articulated four‑fold hierarchy appears only late in the Ṛgveda (the Puruṣa Sūkta), that varṇa in early Vedic literature is “embryonic,” and that the first clearly definable caste is that of the Brahmins formed around a unified oral canon in the Kuru realm through gotra‑based endogamy. As agriculture expanded and surplus grew, an alliance between priestly and royal power—what Joseph calls the core of the varṇa‑jāti system—proved politically and economically convenient, and later Brāhmaṇa and Dharma texts universalized this hierarchy by mapping it onto the cosmos itself. The result, by the beginning of the Common Era, was an elaborated ideology of varṇāśrama‑dharma that kings across the subcontinent could invoke to legitimise power and extraction.​

            Ambedkar’s insight that caste is a structure of “graded inequality,” an “ascending scale of reverence and descending scale of contempt,” finds here a concrete genealogy. Ancient philosophy did not simply “discover” an eternal order; it helped construct and justify a historically contingent alliance that aligned metaphysics with privilege.​

 

Is “Indian philosophy” really pan‑Indian?

            This raises a disturbing question: whose thought is being presented when we speak of “Indian philosophy”? The classical systems are profound achievements, but they largely emerged within and often reinforced a Brahmanical social order that normalized caste hierarchy and restricted access to learning. Large sections of India’s population—Dalits, tribal communities, women, and other subaltern groups—were excluded from recognised philosophical discourse and often from literacy itself.​

            Joseph’s geography of caste strengthens this critique. He traces how the Brahmanical varṇa project arose in a specific region—Kurukṣetra and later “Āryāvarta”—and met persistent resistance in what Johannes Bronkhorst calls “Greater Magadha,” where Śramaṇa traditions such as Buddhism and Jainism rejected Vedic authority, opposed sacrificial violence, and admitted members regardless of varṇa. Gana‑saṅgha polities like the Śākyas did not easily accommodate the priest‑king alliance; Buddhist texts record Brahmin resentment when their ritual status was not honoured in such settings. Even the semantics of “dharma” became a battleground, with Aśoka’s edicts and Śramaṇa usage pressing a moral meaning centred on compassion, generosity, and non‑violence, while early Dharmasūtras rushed to re‑assert a varṇa‑ordered dharma policed by Brahmins.​

            The classical philosophical schools—Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya–Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta—are undoubtedly profound intellectual achievements. They have shaped India’s metaphysical vocabulary and ethical imagination for centuries. Yet, it must be acknowledged honestly that these systems largely emerged within, and often reinforced, a Brahmanical social order. Their reflections on liberation, knowledge, and duty were frequently articulated from within a social framework that accepted caste hierarchy as normative, even sacred. As a result, large sections of India’s population—Dalits, tribal communities, women, and other marginalized groups—were excluded not only from philosophical debate but from being recognized as legitimate bearers of wisdom.

            From this perspective, the question is not whether these classical systems are valuable—they clearly are—but whether they can claim to exhaust what counts as “Indian philosophy.” For me, the answer must be no. India has always been home to multiple philosophies, many of which were philosophies of dissent rather than system-building. Dalit philosophies, tribal cosmologies rooted in land and community, women’s embodied wisdom transmitted through oral traditions, and materialist schools such as the Cārvāka tradition represent alternative ways of thinking about life, suffering, freedom, and truth. These traditions were not merely different; they were often actively suppressed because they challenged ritual authority, caste privilege, and metaphysical justifications of inequality.

            The case of the Cārvākas is particularly revealing. As my paper on this subject (2023) shows, Cārvāka philosophy represents one of the earliest traditions of philosophical dissent in India. Rejecting Vedic authority, ritual sacrifice, and the metaphysics of karma and rebirth, the Cārvākas grounded ethics in lived experience, material reality, and human flourishing in this world. Their near-erasure from mainstream philosophical curricula is not accidental; it reflects a long history of privileging metaphysical systems that aligned with Brahmanical power over philosophies that questioned its foundations. Similar dynamics can be observed in the marginalization of Dalit and tribal philosophies, whose critiques of caste and hierarchy were often dismissed as “non-philosophical” precisely because they threatened the dominant order.

            These philosophies are not aligned with the mainstream darśanas—and they do not seek to be. They are philosophies of rebellion, resistance, and survival. Yet they are no less philosophical for that reason. On the contrary, they engage some of the most fundamental philosophical questions: What counts as a good life? Who has the authority to define truth? How should power, suffering, and dignity be understood? In many ways, they speak more directly to the lived reality of the majority of Indian people than the abstract metaphysical systems that dominate textbooks.

 

Contemporary Indian thought: argument, dissent, and liberation

            Among modern thinkers, B. R. Ambedkar engages this legacy with unmatched moral urgency. In Annihilation of Caste, he argues that caste is not an abnormality but a structural outcome of key scriptural and philosophical resources, and that doctrines of divinely sanctioned varṇa‑dharma and ritual purity are incompatible with constitutional ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Any philosophy adequate to a democratic India must therefore be measured by its capacity to dismantle caste rather than sacralise it.​ This is where Hindutva philosophy fails as it struggles to uphold the varna system rather than the ideals of the Indian Constitution, but that is a topic for another discussion.

            Amartya Sen, in The Argumentative Indian, insists that India’s past is not only metaphysical but deeply argumentative: Buddhist councils, epic dialogues, and scholastic disputations embody a tradition of public reasoning that can nourish democratic dissent today. Sen’s retrieval of an indigenous culture of argument complements Ambedkar’s call to annihilate caste: both refuse the image of an inherently “hierarchical” India and highlight counter‑traditions of critique and debate.​ Dialogue and rebellion against injustice are the soul of Indian cultural and philosophical heritage, and not reverence of unjust hierarchies which regard certain class of individuals, castes and groups as superior and others inferior in a societal system.

            Daya Krishna pushes this further by challenging the closure of “Indian philosophy” itself. In Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective and The Future of Indian Philosophy, he argues that concepts like dharma, karma, and mokṣa must be reopened to contemporary questioning rather than treated as frozen authorities. In his view, genuine Indian philosophy is not the repetition of classical positions but an ongoing, dialogical interrogation that must make room for subaltern and dissenting voices.​ In other words, these ideas should be revisited and reviewed from the modern perspectives of social justice and humanism.


A Catholic Perspective

            The Catholic social teaching provides a convergent yet distinct critique. Gaudium et Spes insists that every form of discrimination based on “sex, race, color, social condition, language, or religion” contradicts God’s intent, thereby implicitly condemning caste‑based exclusion. Fratelli Tutti calls for social friendship and universal fraternity, offering a theological language for solidarity that resonates with constitutional morality and Ambedkar’s fraternity. In India, the Church’s schools and social apostolates can embody practices of inclusion that challenge caste boundaries, even as the Church must repent of having sometimes mirrored those very hierarchies. In this regard, strict internal assessment of practices which harbor and encourage casteism and other related forms of injustices must be identified and rooted out. Only when this is done can the Church in India truly stand up for the protection of those oppressed for millennia by the unjust social order.

 

Ignatian discernment and the limits of inculturation

            At this stage of my reflection, the question is no longer simply what Indian philosophy offers, but how one should engage it responsibly. Here Ignatian discernment has become an indispensable guide for me—and, I believe, for others who stand at similar crossroads of culture, faith, and conscience. Ignatian spirituality does not ask us to accept traditions wholesale, nor does it encourage a posture of suspicion toward everything inherited. Instead, it invites a disciplined freedom: the freedom to receive with gratitude what leads to life and the courage to refuse what diminishes human dignity, even when such elements come wrapped in the language of tradition, sanctity or inculturation.

            Ignatius of Loyola’s insistence on discernment of spirits—attending carefully to movements that lead towards greater faith, hope, love and justice and resisting those that foster fear, domination, or exclusion—offers a powerful framework for engaging Indian philosophy with partiality. By partiality, I do not mean arbitrariness or cultural disdain, but a morally responsible selectivity. Not every insight that is ancient is therefore liberating; not every cultural form is automatically compatible with the Gospel or with the demands of justice. Ignatian discernment teaches us to “test” traditions by their fruits, especially by how they affect the most vulnerable.

            In this sense, Ignatian discernment resonates strikingly with the Buddha’s advice to the Kālāmas: not to accept teachings merely because they are ancient, authoritative, or widely revered, but to examine whether they lead to compassion, wisdom, and the reduction of suffering. This convergence is significant. It suggests that critical discernment is not a foreign imposition on Indian thought, but a practice deeply consonant with some of its most ethical and emancipatory strands. Both traditions resist blind conformity and invite a reflective, experience-tested commitment to truth.

            This approach also helps clarify the limits of inculturation. Inculturation, when rightly understood, is not the uncritical baptism of cultural practices, but a discerning encounter between faith and culture. History offers sobering lessons here. In the Indian context, the misplaced zeal of certain early missionaries—who equated cultural accommodation with Gospel fidelity—allowed caste distinctions to enter ecclesial life, sometimes even being justified as “Indian” expressions of Christianity. What was presented as inculturation often amounted to the sacralization of social hierarchy. The result was a Church that, at times, mirrored the very structures of exclusion it was called to challenge.

            Ignatian discernment exposes this failure not as a lack of cultural sensitivity, but as a failure of conscience. It reminds us that the ultimate criterion for inculturation is not cultural continuity but the promotion of greater justice, equality, and human dignity. Any philosophical or cultural element—whether Brahmanical metaphysics, ritual purity codes, or inherited social hierarchies—that normalizes exclusion must be subjected to critical scrutiny, regardless of its antiquity or prestige.

            For me, then, Ignatian discernment offers a way of inhabiting Indian philosophy without being captive to it. It allows me to learn from Nyāya’s rigor, Yoga’s discipline, Vedānta’s depth, and Buddhism’s compassion, while simultaneously standing in solidarity with Dalit, tribal, and dissenting traditions that expose the violence hidden beneath certain metaphysical ideals. It resists both romanticization and rejection. Most importantly, it places conscience—not tradition, caste, or cultural pride—at the center of philosophical engagement.

            This discerning posture prepares the ground for the conclusion that follows. If ancient Indian philosophy is to contribute meaningfully to India’s evolving social thought today, it must be approached neither as untouchable scripture nor as a relic to be discarded, but as a field of moral testing. Ignatian discernment equips us for precisely this task: to walk with our traditions, question them honestly, and allow them to be transformed in the light of justice, compassion, and the common good.

 

Conscience at the crossroads

            The distance afforded by studying in France has sharpened, rather than resolved, the tension between reverence and critique. From outside, it becomes clearer that what is presented as “Indian philosophy” is often a curated Brahmanical canon whose transmission has systematically marginalised other voices. From within, as a Jesuit trained in discernment, it becomes impossible to accept any philosophical claim without asking about its ethical and social consequences.

            Ancient Indian philosophy shapes contemporary Indian social thought in an ambivalent way. On the one hand, it offers resources for rational inquiry, inner freedom, ecological sensitivity, and inter‑religious dialogue. On the other hand, it provides narratives that have justified caste hierarchy, gender inequality, and ritualised exclusion, often by presenting a contingent social order as a cosmic necessity. Joseph’s notion of Homo opportunisticus—political and economic actors who build sacralised orders to entrench their power—reminds us that philosophy and theology can become instruments of this opportunism when they lose contact with the victims of the systems they justify.​

            For a society committed to constitutional morality and social justice, nostalgia for a putatively golden past or outright rejection of tradition are equally inadequate. What is needed is discernment. Sen’s “argumentative” heritage, Ambedkar’s uncompromising critique, Daya Krishna’s call to reopen canonical concepts, Śramaṇa and Dalit resistances, and Catholic social teaching on human dignity can together form a kind of ecumenical “school of conscience.”

            Hence for me, my engagement with Indian philosophy is therefore not merely academic but moral and spiritual. It asks which philosophies help me see the human person more fully/completely, and which normalize domination. It asks whose voices have shaped the canon, and whose have been erased. The path forward is not to abandon India’s philosophical past, but to walk with it critically: retrieving what gives life, resisting what dehumanizes, and welcoming suppressed traditions of dissent as equal partners in imagining India’s social future. Only such a discerning engagement can honour both the depth of India’s ancient wisdom and the non‑negotiable demands of social-justice today.


Key references

  • Ambedkar, B. R. Annihilation of Caste.
  • Bronkhorst, Johannes. Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India.​
  • Daya Krishna. Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective; The Future of Indian Philosophy.
  • Gaudium et Spes (1965), Vatican II.​
  • Francis, Pope. Fratelli Tutti (2020).​
  • Joseph, Tony. “Homo opportunisticus: The contingent, contested evolution of caste.” The Hindu, 2025.​
  • Sen, Amartya. The Argumentative Indian.
  • Saldanha, S. “Cārvāka philosophy, the first philosophy of dissent.” 2023.​ https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8167185

Before the Facts Arrive: On the power of the first frame

  Before the Facts Arrive: On the power of the first frame Savio Saldanha SJ 22-September-2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22883874       ...